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Part of Intelligence Report Published in N.Y. Tabloid

Security Question

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Large segments of the secret report of the House intelligence committee were printed yesterday in a 24-page supplement to The Village Voice, a weekly tabloid newspaper published in New York.

Publication of the 338-page report was blocked Jan. 29 by a vote of the House after Ford administration officials claimed that its disclosure would damage the national security.

Many members of the House, as well as critics of America's intelligence-gathering apparatus, have expressed doubt about some contents of the report and the quality of the investigation that produced it.

The report snipes again and again at Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, contending he placed one obstacle after another in the way of the committee's getting material and, when he appeared before it, lied.

The report at one point says that "Dr. Kissinger's comments ... are at variance with the facts."

It describes Kissinger as having a "passion for secrecy" and as trying "to control dissemination and analysis of data."

In sum, the excerpts of the House panel's report describe the American intelligence community as often inept, not out of control (as has often been charged), and as frequently considering itself beyond the laws of the land.

For instance, then-President Johnson in 1967 blocked the CIA from offering further covert assistance to educational or other private voluntary institutions, after disclosures that the CIA had been sneaking money to the National Students Association.

The Village Voice excerpts quote CIA deputy director Carl Duckett as testifying that the CIA still maintains covert contracts with "a small number of universities."

The report talks of most of the CIA's covert activities as haphazard and in effect lacking any master plan, saying that "the overall picture . . . does not support the contention that covert action has been used in furtherance of any particular principle, form of government, or identifiable national interest."

"Instead," the report continues, "the record indicates a general lack of a long-term direction in U.S. foreign policy. Covert actions, as the means for implementing a policy, reflected this Band-aid approach, substituting short-term remedies for problems which required long-term cures."

Yet at another point the report claims that "all evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control, has been highly responsive to the instructions of the President and the assistant to the President for national security affairs."

What is absent, the report suggests, is any kind of controls on the CIA and its fellow intelligence-gathering agencies.

The report makes much of the fact that the intelligence community has never been frank about how much it spends, which the committee claims is "at least three to four times the amount reported to Congress."

That means it all costs about $10 billion a year, says the report, with almost no controls, no checks, no balances.

As a result, says the committee, the CIA has been able to do some unusual things with the taxpayers' money, including developing "a huge arsenal of weapons and access to ammunition . . . giving it a capability that exceeds most armies of the world," having put at least $75 million into Italian politics, and serving in effect as a discount shopper for some foreign officials.

The CIA's budget, it says, "appears as only a single line item" in the budget, giving the agency "an unusual advantage" in its ability to transfer money from area to area unimpeded.

The committee points out that the General Accounting Office, because of the CIA's penchant for secrecy, cannot even balance the CIA's books, "let alone analyze its efficiency," and that last year the CIA, National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency all refused information the GAO was seeking.

At the Office of Management and Budget, only six employees work full-time on foreign intelligence, three of those are former CIA employees, and the CIA's budget head recently transferred there from the OMB, the report said.

"This," it added, ". . . does not bode well for a vigorous review of the merits of intelligence programs."

"All this adds up," says the intelligence committee, "to more than $10 billion being spent by a handful of people, with little independent supervision, with inadequate controls, even less auditing, and an overabundance of secrecy."

The report recounts the committee's inquiry into six events as illustrative of the intelligence community's performance.

The Vietcong Tet offensive in early 1968 is cited as an instance where enemy force levels were generated for "political purposes" and other intelligence collected was subjected to "biased misinterpretations."

In the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia on Aug. 20, 1968, the report says, U.S. intelligence "failed to provide a warning that the Soviets 'decided to intervene with force.'" The report states that U.S. technical intelligence "learned of the Soviet invasion several hours before" Czech radio announced it, but that word did not reach Washington before President Johnson received his first word — from Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin.

Technical intelligence (apparently electronic intercepts) did not reach Washington "until days later," the report says.

In the 1973 Middle East war, the report says, U.S. intelligence again "failed."

The community, according to the report, "argued that the political climate in the Arab nations was not conducive to a major war" just a week before it broke out.

The report charges that the worldwide U.S. alert ordered by President Nixon on Oct. 24, 1973, was the result of "poor intelligence." Three DIA

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